Rankings to evaluate opportunity distributions present in most literature judge a policy (change from one distribution of opportunities to another) on the basis of the changes created and, thus, independently of the original situation. This paper proposes a group of axioms capturing the idea that rankings of equality of opportunities might consider not only the changes promoted, but also the initial situation in society.
Introduction Opportunities
According to classical theories of welfarism, social situations should be evaluated by the extent to which the preferences of individuals are satisfied.
Hence, in line with the view that individuals choose the life providing them with the greatest welfare, we could merely evaluate social situations by observing the way of life actually chosen by individuals. 1 However, several contemporary theories of justice are less enthusiastic on such a narrow way of judging societies. Examples include Dworkin [8, 9] , who proposes paying attention to individual resources when describing the goodness of a social situation. Rawls [21] places special emphasis on certain resources available to agents, i.e., primary goods. Sen [23] complements Rawls' approach by suggesting that capabilities to function be considered, i.e., the interaction between available resources and individual abilities. Arneson [3] also suggests departing from actual welfare and focus on opportunity for welfare.
In a nutshell, some of these authors argue that preferences can be affected by the availability of opportunities, as in the case of adaptive preferences, posed by Elster [11] . These theories further endorse that the intrinsic value of the availability of opportunities, i.e., the freedom of choice, has to be considered. 2 Hence, we should pay more attention to an objective description of the set of opportunities available to individuals at the moment of taking life decisions, while incorporating the intrinsic value of the availability of opportunities. In short, social situations should be judged by describing, for each individual, the collection of alternative lives available: their opportunity sets. 1 In practice, most studies tend to focus exclusively on income as a proxy for welfare. 2 Sen [23, 24] and Pattanaik and Xu [19] also discuss the role of preferences vis-a-vis opportunities.
From a more technical perspective, an available life or opportunity can be understood as a description of all the aspects of a possible life the individual may choose to follow. There are at least two different formalizations of this concept that have attracted attention. In the literature that goes back to the measurement of freedom of choice, an opportunity is an abstract and flexible description of those aspects of life that we may consider relevant.
Thus, opportunities have no particular mathematical structure and an opportunity set is just a subset of the universal set of opportunities. 3 In the literature that goes back to the notion of capabilities, an opportunity is a vector of functionings, where functionings are all kinds of personal achievements that individuals may obtain in their lives. Then, an opportunity set can be represented by a set (not necessarily convex) in the space ℝ . 4 Not surprisingly, these two literatures are intimately connected. In many cases, the latter constitutes a particularization of the former that allows those nonwelfarist approaches to be used in applied studies. An example is the study of Echavarri and Permanyer [10] that adapts the proposals of Herrero et al. [14] to the context of functionings.
In this paper, we adopt the view that social situations should be ranked considering the opportunity sets available to individuals in society objectively. We formalize our debate technically by using the more flexible modelization of opportunities.
Evaluation of Opportunity Distributions
A natural approach to ranking social situations in terms of opportunity sets of individuals is to incorporate the key classical concepts of inequality and, 3 See, for instance, Kranich [16] , Herrero [13] , Herrero et al. [14] , Bossert et al. [6] , Ok and Kranich [18] , Savaglio and Vanucci [22] , Weymark [26] , Alcalde-Unzu et al. [1] and Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] (for a survey of some of this literature, see Peragine [20] ). 4 In this context, opportunity sets are also called capability sets. See, for instance, Fleurbaey [12] and Echavarri and Permanyer [10] .
as a consequence, to reformulate the notion of advantage embedded in them.
For instance, the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle states that a transfer from an advantaged to a disadvantaged individual (without reversing the order) results in a better social situation. In the income distribution framework, the notion of advantage is defined through the well-ordered welfare or income of individuals. However, the non-welfarist framework of opportunities lacks a unique clear notion of advantage. A widely used candidate to substitute income is the cardinality of the opportunity set (see Pattanaik and Xu [19] ). This ranking can be considered to only measure very limited aspects of freedom of choice and it is thus a rather crude basis for comparing individual opportunity sets. However, according to the view that individual preferences are not as relevant, few alternatives remain. We may obviously use a social common ranking for evaluating the goodness of an opportunity set. Unfortunately, Ok [17] proved that the cardinality-based criterion is the unique complete ranking that makes the reformulation of the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle and some other basic properties of equality compatible.
An incomplete ranking of individual opportunity sets may alternatively be considered. Existing literature has paid special attention to the inclusion ranking (that is, an individual is advantaged with respect to another only if the former has all the opportunities available to the latter).
Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] present characterization results showing that most of the literature on ranking social situations through opportunity sets can be summarized by accepting either the cardinality or the inclusion notion of advantage and building upon one of these notions by:
(a) Imposing minimal conditions regarding the goodness of opportunity distributions based on some classical fairness concepts: Anonymity, which implies that the names of the agents should not matter; Assimilation, which implies that the opportunity profile obtained as a result of the addition of common opportunities to all agents or the replacement of distinct opportu-nities by common ones, should not be worse than the original opportunity profile; and Priority for the Poor, which implies that giving new opportunities to those agents who are undoubtedly most disadvantaged should be better than giving them to other agents (or to no agent). 5 (b) Imposing an Independence condition on the policies undertaken resulting in changes in the sets of opportunities available to different agents in society. 6 Specifically, the comparison of the goodness of two societies is not Under the cardinality approach, Theorem 3.1 establishes a family of 5 Priority for the Poor is called Monotonicity in Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] . 6 The technical definition of a policy will be provided in Section 2. In non-technical terms, a policy is a description of the differences between any two opportunity profiles.
These differences could eventually (but not necessarily) be the result of the application of a policy undertaken by a government to the first profile leading to the second profile. 
Ranking Opportunity Distributions through Independent Evaluation of Policies
Our stylized model deals mainly with the three-agent case. We consider this case to be the most prominent, as it preserves the clarity and intuition of the common two-agent case within this literature, while it also incorporates some interesting features that are only present in the general ( -agent) case.
For instance, in a three-agent society, it is possible to consider how an agent who is neither the most disadvantaged nor the most advantaged should be treated in the pursuit of equity. Hence, consider a society consisting of three individuals = {1, 2, 3} and an infinite set that describes all possible opportunities. An opportunity set for agent ∈ is an element ∈ , where denotes the set of all non-empty and finite subsets of .
A social situation will be judged according to the profile of opportunity sets
We look for criteria to rank profiles of opportunity sets, and we denote by ≿ ⊆ 3 × 3 a transitive and complete binary relation.
We interpret ≿ as "profile O is socially preferred to profile U". The relations ≻ and ∼ are defined as usual.
Given ∈ 3 , we say that the collection of sets = { , } ∈ ∈ ( ∪∅) 6 such that ⊆ , ∩ = ∅ and = ( ∖ ) ∪ ∈ for all ∈ is a policy compatible with . A compatible policy describes the opportunities that are added to and removed from the opportunity sets of the individuals in the society. That is, given the initial situation of individual described by opportunity set , opportunities are removed from the opportunity set of individual , and opportunities are added to the opportunity set of individual . 7 As a consequence of the removal and addition of opportunities,
individual resulting set of opportunities should be non-empty. We say that the opportunity profile = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) is the social consequence of applying the policy to the profile . We say that a policy applied to a profile ∈ 3 is good (respectively bad, respectively neutral) if the profile obtained after the application of the policy is strictly better (respectively strictly worse, respectively indifferent) than the initial profile .
The first three basic properties of the model judge certain policies as good, bad or neutral policies. The first classical property on the evaluation of social situations is that the names of the agents should not matter. To formally define this property, we make use of some particular permutations over the set of individuals. Given a social situation ∈ 3 , denotes the set of permutations of such that
, (2) , (3) ) is denoted by ( ). 8 7 The requirements ⊆ and ∩ = ∅ are introduced to guarantee that the impact of a policy is equivalent across different profiles. 8 Throughout the paper, we avoid making the universal quantifier for permutations
In other words, a policy that reallocates the entire opportunity sets among the individuals is neutral. This is a standard property in the literature.
The second basic property deals with the provision of common opportunities to agents, which should be considered to be not worse than the provision of heterogeneous opportunities or the absence of any provision.
To formally define this property, we introduce the following notation: ∪ will be the set that includes all opportunities that at least one individual in has; i.e, ∪ = ∪ ∈ and, similarly, ∩ will be the set of opportunities that all individuals in have; i.e, ∩ = ∩ ∈ .
Assimilation (ASM): For all ∈ 3 and for all ∈ ( ∖ ∪ ) and
whenever:
In other words, the first part of the property says that the policy that assigns a novel common opportunity to all individuals is never bad. This first part is a weakening of the standard Independence of Common Expansions property that imposes indifference between the original situation and the resulting one. The second part of the property says that a policy removing a certain uncommon opportunity of each agent and providing a common opportunity to all of them is never bad. This second part is a weakening of the standard Assimilation property to avoid certain controversies. For a wide discussion on these weakenings, see Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester [2] . The justification of this property differs depending on the notion of advantage explicit when writing ( ). The third basic property has to do with a basic idea of equalization.
Giving new opportunities to those agents who are undoubtedly most disadvantaged should be better than giving them to other agents or to no agent.
To formally define this property, we make use of the concept of nested profiles of opportunity sets. A profile is nested if
. In particular, denotes the set of nested profiles in which the identity mapping belongs to . That is, = { ∈ 3 such that 3 ⊆ 2 ⊆ 1 }. We also define for any ∈ 3 , ∈ and ∈ , a new profile ( , ) for which individual has the set ∪ { } and any other individual ∈ ∖ { } has the opportunity set .
Priority for the Poor (PRI): For all ∈ , for all , ∈ such that > and for all ∕ ∈ , ( , ) ≿ ( , ), with strict preference if = 3
and ∈ for all ∕ = 3.
In other words, we can undoubtedly claim in a nested profile that agent 1 is more advantaged than agent 2 and also, agent 2 is more advantaged than agent 3. 9 Hence, any policy that assigns an opportunity to a disadvantaged individual is never bad. Any policy that removes an opportunity from an advantaged individual and assigns it to a disadvantaged individual is never bad. Finally, a policy that assigns an opportunity to the most disadvantaged individual that all the other individuals already have is always good.
In addition to these properties, the proposals of the literature satisfy a condition of Independence that reflects the following idea: the application of a common policy with certain characteristics to two different societies does not modify the judgement regarding which of these societies is better.
To introduce the axiom formally, some extra notation is needed. A nonreversal policy is a policy where the positions of the individuals according to the ranking used to judge advantage do not revert. 10 As has already been Note that this claim is true both for the set inclusion notion of advantage and the cardinality notion, which is merely a completion of the former. 10 Non-reversal policies are also discussed in other frameworks, such as the literature on horizontal equity of tax policies. The idea behind horizontal equity is to describe a progressive transfer in which individuals are equalized, but their relative situation is not reverted. In tax literature, the pre-tax income distribution is considered to have ethical status that should not be totally violated (see King [15] , for example).
specifications of the axiom:
Independence-cardinality (IND-#): For all , ∈ and for all ∈ # ∩ # , ≿ ⇒ ≿ .
Independence-inclusion (IND-
The combination of Independence and the above properties implies that any policy should be considered either good or bad, but judgement should always be made independently of the original society to which it is applied. such that for all , ∈ 3 , 
The criteria of these two families differ in the values of the parameters and . These values reflect the different concerns for equality and efficiency issues of the criterion under consideration. To give one example, the criterion with = (−1, 0) is a criterion of the equality criteria family characterized by Kranich [16] , meanwhile the criterion with = (0, 0) corresponding with the maxmin criterion (discussed by Bossert et al. [6] ) shows more concern for efficiency issues. 11 
Ranking Opportunity Distributions through Dependent Evaluation of Policies
Section 2 discusses rankings of opportunity distributions that incorporate the idea that the initial situation should not matter when evaluating policies that change the distribution of opportunities. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt at promoting the idea that policies should be considered good or bad conditional on the society to which they are applied.
Although this dependence may take many different forms, two properties are proposed in this section: Policy Monotonicity and Intermediateness, capturing the scope and degree of the idea of dependence of the status quo for a ranking of equality of opportunities. 12 These axioms will express the idea that this dependence has to be produced with an idea of inequality aversion.
To motivate Policy Monotonicity, suppose that there exist two different societies and , the first of which is considered to provide more equality of opportunities to individuals. Consider a policy that equalizes the indi-11 A fuller description of many of the criteria included in these two families and their characteristics in terms of equality and efficiency considerations is included in AlcaldeUnzu and Ballester [2] . 12 Given that the majority of the literature has focused on equality criteria, we have adopted this interpretation as a starting point for this literature.
viduals in society . Then, Policy Monotonicity states that the same policy equalizes also the individuals in the more unequal society . Consider, for instance, that the policy consists of giving new opportunities to all agents and is able to improve the equality of . That means that the opportunities given by the policy to the disadvantaged agents in society are sufficient to socially compensate the additional opportunities that the advantaged agents are receiving. It is intuitive to think that such a policy must also increase the equality (or, at least, not to decrease it) if applied to a more unequal society , where the margin to improve equality is higher. Notice that Policy
Monotonicity says nothing about the effects on of a policy that constitutes equalization for the more unequal society .
Analogously, Policy Monotonicity also imposes that if a policy reduces the equality of society then it also reduces the equality of the more egalitarian society . Additionally, the property also imposes that the application of the same policy to two equivalent or indifferent societies has the same effect on them. We propose two different formulations of the property, depending on the criterion used to evaluate advantage.
Policy Monotonicity-cardinality (PM-#): For all , ∈ and for all
Policy Monotonicity-inclusion (PM-⊆): For all , ∈ and for all
The second property, Intermediateness, requires the union of two social distributions to be ranked between the two. That is, the addition to a profile of a more (respectively, less) egalitarian profile constitutes a strict increase (respectively, reduction) in equality. If we interpret the union of two nested profiles and as the application of the "policy" to the profile (or, alternatively, the "policy" to the profile ), the axiom has other interpretation: a policy is good (respectively, bad) if, when it can be interpreted as a profile, the policy is more (respectively, less) egalitarian than the status quo distribution. Consider, for example, that is a perfectly egalitarian profile and is any profile with some inequality. Then, the union of and will have some inequality and, then, it will be ranked in terms of equality below . However, it is natural to think that this joint profile will have less inequality than the profile .
We describe the structure of the criteria that satisfy these two new properties on top of the three classical properties described above. We need to introduce the following notation: for all ∈ 3 , ( ) = The results established in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are not complete characterizations of the criteria that satisfy the axioms. Consider the following additional Archimedean Difference property of Kranich [16] and Weymark [26] that establishes the following idea: If we have two infinite sequences of opportunity profiles such that each opportunity profile of the first is more egalitarian than its corresponding opportunity profile of the second, then we can compensate any large difference between any two opportunity profiles by adding a sufficiently large number of opportunity profiles of the sequences to each.
Archimedean Difference (ARCHD): Let { } ∈ℕ and { } ∈ℕ be two infinite sequences in such that ∩ = ∩ = ∅ for all ∕ = and all
Archimedean Difference imposes that when fixing a pair of profilesˆ ,ˆ , regardless of the extent to whichˆ might be more egalitarian thanˆ , this difference is eventually overshadowed by the disparities between 1 , . . . , and 1 , . . . , for sufficiently large . In other words, there is no disparity that cannot be reversed by accumulating a sufficiently large number of other disparities.
Imposing ARCHD immediately implies, for each of the families, that all cases with an equal weighted sum are indifferent. Intermediateness, which value the goodness of a policy depending on the original profile to which they are applied. This is contrary to the classical tendency that evaluates policies independently of the profile to which they are applied. We have combined these two new properties with three classical properties (Anonymity, Assimilation and Priority for the Poor) in order to construct new criteria to rank opportunity profiles in terms of equality.
One of the key concepts for understanding our properties is the redef- example, Atkinson [4] and Dardanoni [7] ). The concept of policy introduced in this paper can be adapted to this dynamic context as the description of the changes from the distribution of opportunities of one generation to the next one. Then, the classification of societies in terms of mobility can be performed by ranking policies. However, the analysis of these policies in the mobility framework may be carried out with different axioms that the ones proposed in this paper for measuring equality. For example, imposing that all permutation policies are equivalent independently of the set of individuals that have interchanged their positions, as our Anonymity property establishes, may be controversial depending on the interpretation of mobility adopted. For example, this does not seem to be a good property if we are trying to measure mobility as movement. 13
Appendix: Proofs of the results
We will need the following lemmas for the proofs. Let We are now going to prove that for all ⃗ ∈ and all ∈ ℕ, ⃗ ⃗ . Hence, by transitivity, (2 +1)⃗ (2 +1)⃗ , which is not possible. The case of ⃗ ⃗ is also impossible and can be proved by similar reasoning. Therefore, the result is straightforward, given that ∑ ∈ ( ) = 1 for all ∈ 3 .
□
The following result can be proved using a very similar argument. We omit here the proof. Therefore, we opt for including the proof only for Theorem 3.1, but it is easy to see that Theorem 3.2 can be proved following exactly the same steps.
We now introduce the following definitions.
Definition 4.1 For all ⃗ , ⃗ ∈ , ⃗ Lorenz dominates ⃗ if 1 ≥ 1 and
We formulate the following claims that will help us to construct the proof. Proof: Let ⃗ = (
where use has been made of the assumption that
The application of transitivity concludes the proof of the weak case.
We now prove the strict case. As above, let ⃗ = (
) and ⃗ = ( 
14 We derived this from PRI starting with a nested profile in which the disadvantaged individual has 3 opportunities, the advantaged individual has − 3 − 4 opportunities and the individual between them has 4 opportunities. Then, the result is obtained by enlarging the opportunity set of the disadvantaged individual by adding an opportunity that is already possessed by the others.
Proof: We prove only the first equivalence as the proof of other parts is similar. Let ⃗ = (
and we arrive at the desired result. □ 
Proof: We prove the second part, and omit the proof of the first part,
given that it is proved in a similar way. Suppose that
Reflexivity excludes the possibility that 1 = 2 . Suppose that 1 < 2 . If and ⃗ ⃗ 1 ⃗ , and applying transitivity we arrive at a contradiction.
(d) If ( 1 − ) ∈ (0, 1) and ( 2 − ′ ) ∈ (0, 1) with < ′ , we can apply reasoning similar to that used in the preceding case.
The case in which < 0 is similar and, thus, it is omitted. □ Claim 4.5 For all ⃗ ∈ ℤ 2 and all ⃗ , ⃗ , (⃗ + ⃗ ), (⃗ + ⃗ ) ∈ , we have that
Proof: First, we know from Claim 4.1 that for all ⃗ ∈ ℤ 2 such that 1 > 0 and 1 + 2 > 0 that (⃗ + ⃗ ) ⃗ for all ⃗ ∈ . We can also deduce from Claim 4.1 that for all ⃗ ∈ ℤ 2 such that 1 < 0 and 1 + 2 < 0, we have that ⃗ (⃗ + ⃗ ) for all ⃗ ∈ . Thus, without loss of generality, we only need to consider the cases in which 1 ≥ 0, 2 < 0 and 1 ≤ | 2 |. 15 We divide the proof into the following cases: 
